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I. INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of Florida resolved several issues of statutory
construction this past year, which had been festering in the appellate courts,
involving appeals in dependency and termination of parental rights cases and
dispositions in juvenile delinquency cases. The intermediate appellate
courts continued a more than decade long process of holding trial courts
accountable to comply with basic statutory provisions within chapters 39 and
985 of the FloridaStatutes.

While the legislature did not make wholesale changes to the law
governing children either in the dependency system or in the juvenile
delinquency system, there were several substantial changes which are
referenced in this survey. One change involved adding harm from substance
abuse explicitly to the grounds for dependency and, ultimately, termination
of parental rights.!
Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. Colgate University, 1967, Boston College Law School, J.D., 1970. The
author thanks Tracey McPharlin and Amy Bloom for their assistance in the preparation of this
article. This article covers cases decided through June 30, 1999.
1. Ch. 99-186, § 2, 1999 Fla. Laws 1001, 1010-12 (codified at FLA. STAT.
39.01(30)(g) (1999)).
*
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II. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

A.

Detention Issues

Detention issues occur regularly in the appellate case law,2 and this year
was no exception. A significant issue involving use of detention for
incompetent juveniles arose in J.W. v. Departmentof Juvenile Justice.3 The
issue involved the ability of the trial court, to order the placement of an
incompetent child in secure detention.4 Without much analysis, the appellate
court held that, although the statutes offer little guidance in dealing with a
juvenile in J.W.'s circumstances, the trial court's order was consistent with
Florida law, met the needs of J.W., and ensured the safety of the public.5 The
court thus ruled that there was an adequate basis for the trial court to
conclude that "no less restrictive alternative to secure detention would
protect the safety of the public, especially small children." 6 The appellate
opinion is silent on what steps, if any, the trial court took pursuant to section
985.223 of the Florida Statutes to engage the Department of Children and
Family Services in finding an appropriate placement for the child, nor what
steps would be taken to develop a treatment plan for the child's restoration
to competency.7 It is hard to visualize how placement in detention
constitutes a remedy consistent with section 985.223 of the Florida Statutes
and Rule 8.095(a)(8) of the FloridaRules of Juvenile Procedure,premised
as they are on rehabilitation.8
In a significant ruling on detention and pretrial practice, the Supreme
Court of Florida recently approved an amendment on an interim basis to the
FloridaRules of Juvenile Procedure permitting juveniles to attend detention
hearings via audio-video devices.9 The court had initially ruled on the matter
in 1996 establishing the practice on an interim basis. 10 The court responded to
2.
See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law Issues in Floridain 1998, 23 NOVA L. REv. 819,
831-34 (1999); Michael J.Dale, Juvenile Law: 1991 Survey of Florida Law,22 NovA. L. REv.
179, 180-84 (1997); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1992 Survey of Florida Law, 17 NOVA L.
REv. 335, 348-53 (1992); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1991 Survey of FloridaLaw, 16 NOVA
L. REV. 333, 339-43 (1991).
3.
24 Fla. L. Weekly D1503 (1st Dist. Ct. App. June 21, 1999).
4.
Id. at D1503.
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. See id.
8.
See FLA. STAT. § 985.223 (1999); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.095(a)(8).

9.

Amendment to Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure 8.100(a), 24 Fla. L. Weekly

S196, S196 (Apr. 29, 1999).

10.

See Amendment to Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure 8.100(a), 667 So. 2d 195

(Fla. 1996).
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the petition of several circuits and relied upon what it described as highly
favorable reports to order an amended rule of procedure containing the audio
visual approach for a period of ninety days from the date of the opinion after
which time the court held that it would determine whether further action was
necessary.1 It also directed the Juvenile Procedures Committee of the Florida
Bar to study the matter and make a recommendation concerning a permanent
rule. The positions of the parties, both favoring and opposing the rule, are set
forth in detail in the opinion.1 3 The benefits described included avoiding
humiliation of juveniles who are paraded through the courthouse and allowing
juveniles more time to attend classes and counseling sessions. 14 There was
great support from the judiciary for continuance of the interim rule. 5 The
shortcoming, according to the court, was a hardship to the public defender in
allocating attorneys. 6 The countervailing considerations also relate to the
17
depersonalization of the initial appearance process. Children who are seen
on television, it may be argued, are less likely to be viewed individually and
personally by the court.1 ' The court is thus unable to evaluate the personal
characteristics of the child.' 9
As noted earlier in this survey, the FloridaStatutes provide for services to
juveniles who have been found incompetent to stand trial.20 In Department of
Children & Familiesv. Morrison,21 the trial court ordered a child charged with
first-degree premeditated murder who was adjudged incompetent to stand trial
to be committed to the Department of Children and Family Services for
placement in a secure facility where there would be no integration with adult
patients and where the child would be rehabilitated. 2 The Department
petitioned for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the circuit court was
without authority to order the child to a special mental health facility.23 The
appellate court agreed, finding that Florida law does not provide the trial court
with authority in a commitment order to order a defendant's placement in a

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Amendment, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S198.
Id.
See id. at S196-99.
l at S197-98.
Id. at S197.
Amendment, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S198.
Id. at S197.

18. See id.
19. See id. at S199.
20. See supra Part ll.A. 1 1.
21. 727 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, 741 So. 2d 1136 (Fla.
Aug. 19, 1999).
22. Id. at 405.

23.

Id.
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specific facility or to issue instructions on the defendant's treatment. 24 The
appellate court ruled that the trial court can make a nonbinding
recommendation regarding placement?2 However, the court did differ with the
Department on the issue of housing and treating the indicted child separately
from adults.26 The court held that section 985.215(4) of the Florida Statutes
requires that when a child is prosecuted as an adult, including where indicted
as such, the child should be housed in a jail or facility separately from adult
inmates. 27 Finding an apparent contradiction in the provisions of chapter 985
of the FloridaStatutes, the court sought to harmonize and reconcile them.2 It
concluded that it would be anomalous to say that section 985.215 mandated
separation of juveniles and adults when an indicted juvenile is held in jail, but
that section 985.225 commands that juveniles and adults be lodged together
when committed to a mental health facility. 29 The court did not decide the
issue, finding that the Department was not given notice of the proceedings, and
that the trial court and the Department did not have an opportunity to address
the question
of separate confinement for mental health treatment apart from
30
adults.
Under Florida law, in addition to pretrial detainees, a child committed to
the Department of Juvenile Justice awaiting dispositional placement who has
already been adjudicated, may be placed in secure detention for a short period
of time." In L.K.v. State,3 the court held that, notwithstanding the child's
acquiescence to a longer period of detention, the plain language of the Florida
statute precludes a trial judge ordering detention in excess of fifteen days after
commitment. 33
B.

Adjudicatory Issues

The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure contain detailed discovery
provisions, 34 which have generated appellate decisions in the past.35 In a
recent case, a mother petitioned the appellate court to quash an order
24. Id.
25. Id. at 406.
26. Morrison, 727 So. 2d at 406-07.
27. Id. at 406. See FLA. STAT. § 985.215(4) (1999).
28. Morrison, 727 So. 2d at 406-07.
29. Id. at 407.
30. Id.
31. See . STAT. § 985.215(10)(a) (1999).
32. 729 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
33. Id. at 1011.
34. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.060.
35. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law 1991 Survey of FloridaLaw, 16 NOVA L. REV.
333,344-45 (1991).
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denying her discovery of information in the possession of the medical
examiner and a law enforcement agency who were investigating criminal
charges against her for the death of her infant child. 36 The mother sought the
information as part of her preparation to defend the petition for dependency
of her other two children. 3? The sheriff's department moved for a protective
order, arguing that the information sought both from the office itself and the
medical examiner was exempt from disclosure under Florida law since it was
related to a current criminal investigation of the death of the mother's infant
child.38 The problem was exacerbated by the fact that the two other children
had been removed from the custody of their mother for over seventeen
months based upon the death of the infant.39 There had never been any
report or indication that the mother inflicted any type of injury upon the
children although the mother was a suspect because she was one of the many
individuals who had access to the infant. 4° The court recognized that broad
discovery is provided under the juvenile rules because of the important
interests at stake. 4' The court concluded that although the child's welfare
and best interest must remain paramount, the court was also obligated to
carefully safeguard fundamental liberty interests of the parent in the care,
custody, and management of the child. It then granted the writ of certiorari
and quashed the trial court's order.43
C. DispositionalIssues
Inexplicably, the trial courts have a problem with the proposition that
under Florida law, a child may not be sentenced to a juvenile commitment
for a period of time loner than the maximum sentence for an adult who
commits the same crime. Two recent cases are illustrative of the issue.4 5
Thus, in D.S. v. State,46 the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that it was
reversible error for the trial court to place a child on community control until
the youngster's nineteenth birthday where the maximum penalty for an adult
36.

B.B. v. Department of Children & Family Servs., 731 So. 2d 30, 31 (Fla. 4th Dist.

Ct. App. 1999).
37. Id. at 32.
38. Id.
39.

Id. at 33.

40.

Id.

41.
42.

B.B., 781 So. 2d at 34.
Id.

43.
44.
45.
So. 2d 414
46.

Id.
See FLA. STAT. § 985.231(1)(d) (1999).
See D.S. v. State, 730 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); D.P. v. State, 730
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
730 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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charged with the same offense was shorter.47 Based on the facts of the case,
the child could only have been committed or placed on community control
for one year. 48 In D.P. v. State,49 the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed
the trial court's order committing a juvenile to a high risk facility for sex
offenders for a period not to extend beyond his nineteenth birthday, followed
by community control and aftercare to be planned by the Department of
Juvenile Justice and agproved by the court because it exceeded the
maximum adult penalty.
In an effort to provide a greater variety of, as well greater severity in5
juvenile dispositions, Florida has instituted a serious offender program. 1
The habitual offender provisions of Florida law create procedures to be
followed in order to have a child placed in the serious or habitual juvenile
offender program. 52 Such procedures include a requirement that the state file
a petition seeking serious or habitual juvenile offender placement, service of
such a petition on the child, the child's attorney, and a representative of the
Department of Juvenile Justice, and a reasonable time allowance for the
child to prepare a response.5 3 In D.A. C. v. State,54 the issue was whether the
court could authorize the prosecution of a child as a serious offender even
where the state attorney as prosecutor did not file a petition to do so.J The
appellate court held that the statute does not prohibit the trial court from
imposing habitual offender sentences unless the prosecutor files the petition
the classification. The rule permits, but does not require, the prosecutor to
file the petition and thus allows the court to prosecute habitual or serious
offenders in the absence of a filing by the prosecutor. 57 The statute also
requires the court to decide if the child meets serious offender criteria.58 In
addition, the court held that there is no separation of powers problem

47. Id. at 400. See also J.D. v. State, 732 So. 2d 1135, 1135 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (finding error where the trial court imposed indefinite term of community control for
marijuana and cocaine possession).
48. D.S., 730 So. 2d at 400 (citing J.W. v. State, 709 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1998)); V.W. v. State, 693 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); G.R.A. v. State, 688 So. 2d
1027 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997). See also Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1997 Survey of
FloridaLaw, 22 NOvA L. Ray. 179, 196 (1997) (discussing precisely the same problem).
49. 730 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
50. Id. at 415.
51. See FiA. STAT. § 985.31 (1999).
52. See FIA. R. Jtuv. P. 8.115(d).
53. Id.
54. 728 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, (Fla. Oct. 28, 1999).
55. Id. at 829.
56. Id. at 830.
57. Id. at 829-30.

58.

Id.
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because the purpose
5 9 of the juvenile proceeding is remedial in nature as
opposed to punitive.
An interesting dispositional issue arises when a child with a pending
juvenile delinquency case is the subject of a direct filed information,
charging him or her as an adult. 60 In Medina v. State, 1 a child appealed
from the imposition of adult sentences on juvenile cases which would be
disposed of together with adult cases in the adult court.62 The appellate
court held that once transferred, post-adjudicatory juvenile cases still retain
their juvenile status, and thus the felony division judge or adult criminal
court judge did not have the authority to impose an adult sentence on a child
on these 63cases as to which the child has been adjudicated in the juvenile
division.
Florida's appellate courts are split on a technical issue of court
jurisdiction to extend the dispositional alternative of community control. 64 In
N.W. v. State,65 the Second District Court of Appeal ageed with the Fourth
District Court of Appeal opinion in M.B. v. State that the statutory
provision that a child adjudicated delinquent for a second-degree
misdemeanor is subject to supervision and community control only for six
months where the juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent.67 However,
where a child is not adjudicated delinquent, but rather has had the
adjudication withheld (a permissible alternative in Florida),68 the court may
impose a penalty that is harsher than the one that would be permitted if the
juvenile were adjudicated delinquent. 69 The holdings in N.W. and M.B. are
contrary to the ruling of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in G.R.A. 7 1v.
State; thus, the court in N.W. certified the conflict with the Fifth District.
At both the adjudicative and dispositional stages of delinquency cases,
juveniles have an absolute right to counsel. 72 However, juveniles may, on

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

D.A.C., 728 So. 2d at 830.
See Medina v. State, 732 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
732 So. 2d 1153 (Fla.3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1155.

64.
66.

N.W. v. State, 736 So. 2d 710,710 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Id.
693 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1997).

67.

N.W, 736 So. 2d at 711.

65.

68. See FLA. STAT. §§ 985.228(4), .23(4) (1999).
69. See id; M.B., 693 So. 2d at 1067.
70. 688 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1997).
71. N.W, 736 So. 2d at 711.
72. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); J.R.V. v. State, 715 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1998).
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occasion, be represented by a certified legal intern. 73 In A.D. v. State74 the
record was silent as to whether the child knowingly and intelligently waived
75
the right to legal representation in return for representation by the intern.
Nor was there any showing or assertion that a supervising attorney was
present at the dispositional hearing. 76 Therefore, the court was obligated to
quash the dispositional order and remand for further proceedings based on
Florida case law establishing that there must be approval by the minor of the
intern.77
Periodically, the appellate courts must review appeals on the ground
that the child's waiver of the right to remain silent and have an attorney
present during questioning should be suppressed because the waiver was not
knowing and intelligent.76 In T.S.D. v. State,79 a twelve-year-old with a
history of psychological problems, an IQ of sixty-two, and a third grade
reading level moved to suppress his confession.8 The court applied the
totality of circumstances approach, evaluating the child's intelligence,
education, experience, and his ability to comprehend the meaning and effect
of his statement, in finding that his confession was clearly not admissible.8'
Significantly, the court held that contrary to the State's assertion, the record
demonstrated that the child's prior exposure to the juvenile justice system
did not aid in his comprehension of his rights.82

73. See RULES REGULATING maE RA. BAR 11-1.2(a)--(e) (providing that a law student
may directly provide representation to individuals so long as the student is participating in a law
school credit-bearing clinical program coordinated by the law school and supervised by a lawyer).
74. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1494 (5th Dist. Ct. App. June 25, 1999).
75. Id. at D1494.
76. Id.
77. See id. (citing L.R. v. State, 698 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); In re J.H.,
580 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
78. See FLA. R. Jtrv. P. 8.165. See generally Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1997
Survey of FloridaLaw, 22 NOVA L. REV. 179, 188 (1997); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1992
Survey of FloridaLaw, 17 NovA L. REv. 335, 343-44 (1992); Michael . Dale, Juvenile Law:
1991 Survey of FloridaLaw, 16 NOVA L. REV. 333,335-39 (1991).
79. 24 Fla. L. Weekly Dl149 (3d Dist. Ct. App. May 12, 1999).
80. Id.atDl149.

81.
82.

Id.
Id.
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D. Appellate Issues
The issue of the proper way to take up on appeal a challenge to the
adequacy of a plea colloquy arose in J.M.B. v. State. The appellate court
held that a juvenile may not challenge the voluntariness of his plea on direct
appeal without first moving to withdraw the plea.84 A criminal defendant
can contest the voluntariness of the plea after sentencing by filing a motion
under the FloridaRules of CriminalProcedure. However, because the rule
does not apply in juvenile proceedings, the court held that the only remedy
for the juvenile under the circumstances of the case was the filing of a writ
of habeas corpus in the circuit court.86 Although the court in J.M.B. did not
explain whether the failure to appeal was significant, the Supreme Court of
Florida has held that the failure of the defendant to raise the issue of the
validity of a plea by appeal does not prohibit the individual thereafter from
seeking collateral relief if the issue had not been previously addressed and
ruled on. 87
III. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Adjudicatory Issues
Florida law provides that a parent who is served with a petition for
termination of parental rights must appear at an advisory hearing or in
another manner respond to the notice of the hearing.88 The failure to
respond or appear at an advisory hearing is deemed to constitute consent to
the petition to terminate parental rights." In J.B. v. Departmentof Children
& Family Services,90 the appellate court was asked to decide whether the
father had been denied due process of law by giving him only twenty-four
hours notice of the advisory hearing. 91 The court held that twenty-four hours
was sufficient to meet the minimum due process requirements as an advisory
hearing in a termination of parental rights case is merely a preliminary step
in the process where no rights are finally adjudicated. 92 The court felt that a
83. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1485 (2d Dist. Ct. App. June 25, 1999).
84. Id. at D1485 (citing FLA. R. APP. P. 9.140(2)(B)(iii)).
85. See FLA. R. CfAM. P. 3.850.
86. J.M.B., 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D1485 (citing In re W.B., 428 So. 2d 309, 312 (Fla.4th
Dist.Ct. App. 1983)).

87.
88.
89.

See Robinson v. State, 373 So. 2d 898, 903 (Fla. 1979).
See FLA. STAT. § 39.801(3)(a) (1999).
Id. § 39.801(3)(d).

90.

734 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1999).

91.

Id. at500.

92.

Id.
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parent was not required to prepare for an advisory hearing and retain counsel
in advance and need simply appear and request a postponement. 93 Where the
father did not inform the court that he was not able to attend and did not
have an adequate excuse, the court rejected the claim that he was denied due
process. 94 Over a vigorous dissent, the majority held that while there is a
great deal at stake for the parents, there is also a great deal at stake for the
child, making it unfair to the child to delay the proceedings. 95 The dissent,
describing in detail the constitutionally protected interests in preserving the
family unit in raising children, argued that the abruptness of the resolution of
such an important matter constituted inadequate notice of the hearing.96
Recognizing that the father had no lawyer in the trial court until after the
cases had been remanded following an appeal and that the Department only
gave the father twenty-four hours notice of the termination proceeding, the
dissent concluded that the notice of hearing to terminate the father's parental
rights was constitutionally inadequate. 97
The courts have also been faced with the question of whether the
appearance by counsel at the advisory hearing is adequate to constitute an
appearance so as to avoid a default termination of parental rights.98 In In re
E.L,99 the Second District held that appearance by counsel at an advisory
hearing avoids a default. 1°° Where the court previously had appointed an
attorney for the parent, it was not necessary for the parent to be present, as
her attorney could have told the court whether she consented to the
termination. 0 1
A third case involving the question of whether the failure to appear ma
result in a default judgment of termination of parental rights is In re B.A. g
In this case, the mother failed to appear at the adjudicatory hearing, and the
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. J.B., 734 So. 2d at 501-02.
96. Id. at 503-04.
97. Id. at 505. See also In re S.S., 735 So. 2d 576, 577 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1999)
(holding that it was error to terminate parental rights because notice was inadequate where a
parent failed to appear at an advisory hearing, but attorney did attend, and where notice failed to
include the 1998 change which states, "FAILURE TO PERSONALLY APPEAR AT THIS
ADVISORY HEARING CONSTITUTES CONSENT TO THE TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS OF THIS CHILD (OR CHILDREN)."
.. STAT. § 39.801(3)(a) (1999)
(emphasis added)).

98. See In re M.A., 735 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1999); In re S.S., 735 So. 2d
576 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1999).
99. 732 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).

100. Id. at 39.
101. Id. See M.A., 735 So. 2d at578-79.
102. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1086 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 1999).
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court entered a default of consent to the termination petition.10 3 The
appellate court held that despite the mother's failure to appear at a prior
advisory hearing, the mother's court appointed lawyer was present at. the
advisory hearing and suggested that the mother may not have had the ability
to understand her duty to appear in court.104 The trial court did not enter a
default and granted counsel's request for a competency evaluation.10 5 The
case then proceeded and resulted in the adjudicatory hearing. 1°' Having
found that the case proceeded beyond the advisory stage and onto the
adjudicatory stage, the appellate court held that the trial court lacked
authority to enter a default.
M.E. v. Department of Children & Family Servicesl18 is a fourth case
involving the issue of failure to appear at an adjudicatory hearing of
termination of parental rights.1°9 Before the commencement of trial, the
mother's counsel advised the court of difficulty reaching the client but
informed the court that the client wished to defend against the termination
petition.1 10 The appellate court rejected the mother's contention that it was
required that she be personally served with notice of the termination of
parental rights trial date.'
The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure
provide that after service of the petition for termination of paternal rights
together with notice of an advisory hearing, all other pleadings and papers
must be served on each party or the party's attorney.' It is thus the parent's
obligation to remain13in reasonable touch with the attorney regarding the
progress of the case.
Matters may have been rendered more complicated as a result of a
change in Florida law discussed in a fifth case involving the failure to
appear-In re S.S.1 4 In S.S., the mother did not appear at the advisory
hearing, but an attorney appeared on her behalf and pointed out that the
language in the notice did not conform to the amendments to the notice
statute which were effective October 1, 1998.15 Effective October 1, 1998,
the Florida law was changed to provide that the notification would include
103. Id. at D1086.

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at D1087.
ld.
Id.
BA., 24 Fla. L Weekly at D1087.
728 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 368.
Id.
Id.

112. Id.
(citing FA. R. Juv. P. 8.225(c)(3)).
113. ME., 720 So. 2d at 368.

114. 735 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
115. Id. at 577.
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the following language, "FAILURE TO PERSONALLY APPEAR AT THIS
ADVISORY HEARING
CONSTITUTES
CONSENT TO THE
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OF THIS CHILD (OR
CHILDREN). 'a 16 The issue the court did not have to decide in S.S. was
whether the 1998 amendments precluded an appearance by counsel with the
17
result that there would be a waiver and thus termination of parental rights."
There is a growing body of case law in Florida dealing with the
question of the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem in a dependency or
termination of parental rights proceedings."g In Vestal v. Vestal," 9 the trial
court failed to appoint a guardian ad litem at the outset of a termination of
parental rights case. 12 The Vestal court noted that in several earlier cases
both the Second and Fifth District Courts of Appeal held that the failure to
appoint a guardian in a termination case is not fundamental error. 121 In the
preceding cases which are cited in Vestal, the appellate courts found that the
trial court had sought a guardian but none was available, and based upon the
facts of those cases, there had been no harm to the parent.122 In E.F., the
child had been adequately protected, and the error in not appointing a
guardian was not fundamental.12 3 In Fisher, where a guardian had resigned
and efforts to replace the guardian were unsuccessful, the court held that the
child's rights had been adequately protected. 124 In contrast, in Vestal, the
trial court made no attempt to appoint a guardian and, as a result, no
guardian was appointed, and there was very little involvement by the
Department.125 Thus, there was no testimony from third parties, such as a
guardian, with the result that the case was a credibility contest between an
ex-wife and ex-husband. 126 Under the circumstances of the case, the court
found that the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem was reversible error.127
Although Vestal upheld the right to a guardian ad litem under the facts of the
case, the problem with the opinion and the early cases is that the Florida
116. FLA. STAT. § 39.801(3)(a) (1999) (emphasis added); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.505(b).
117. See S.S., 735 So. 2d at 577.
118. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law in Florida in 1998, 23 NovA L. REv. 819, 82425 (1999); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1997 Survey of Florida Law, 22 NoVA L. REv. 179,
209 (1997).
119. 731 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
120. Id. at 828.
121. Id. at 828-29 (citing Fisher v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 674 So.
2d 207 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); In re E.F., 639 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
122. Fisher,674 So. 2d at 208; E.F., 639 So. 2d at 643-44.
123. E.F., 639 So. 2d at 644.
124. Fisher,674 So. 2d at 208.
125. Vestal, 731 So. 2d at 829.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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courts are carving out an exception to the child's right to a guardian ad litem
where none exists. 128 The Florida statute is absolute on its face. 129 Section
39.807(2)(a) of the FloridaStatutes provides as follows, "[t]he court shall
appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child in any termination of
parental rights proceedings and shall ascertain at each stage of the
This
proceedings whether a guardian ad litem has been appointed."13
mandatory language follows from the federal funding statute known as the
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act ("CAPTA"), which provides for
guardians ad litem in Florida. 131 It is unclear why the courts disregard the
language of the statute and the applicability of federal law.
Under Florida law, cases involving termination of parental rights are
confidential and closed to the public. 3 2 The issue before the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in Department of Children & Family Services v. Natural
Parentsof J.B.133 was whether the statute closing all hearings throughout the
case to the public and the media was unconstitutional.'3 The appeals court
held that the mandatory closure statute was not unconstitutional under either
the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments and that termination ofparental rights
cases are not indistinguishable from criminal prosecutions.
The Fourth
District Court
of
Appeals
upheld
the
closure,
finding
no
constitutional
136
violation.
Florida's termination of parental rights statute provides that termination
may be based upon a child's adjudication as dependent, the filing of the case
plan, and the finding that the child continues to be abused, neglected or
abandoned. 37 The statute also provides that the failure of the parent to
substantially comply with the case plan for a period of twelve months after
the child has been adjudicated may constitute evidence of continuing abuse
and neglect or abandonment.
Exceptions to this requirement occur when
the failure to substantially comply with the case plan results from either lack
of financial resources or when the Department fails to make reasonable
efforts to reunify the family. 139 In re K.C.C.' ° dealt with the factual
128. Compare FLA. STAT. §§ 39.807(2)(a), .822(1) (1999) and Vestal, 731 So. 2d at
829 with Fisher,674 So. 2d 208 and E.F., 639 So. 2d 644-45.
129. See id.

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

RL
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-19 (1995 & Supp. 1999).
FLA. STAT. § 39.809(4) (1999).
736 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 112.
Id. at 117-18.
Idat 118.

137. RA
138. Id.
139. Id.

STAT.

Published by NSUWorks, 1999

§ 39.806(1)(e) (1999).

13

Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 6

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 24:179

question of what constitutes proper financial resources. 14 1 At issue was the
situation a father whose physical and mental problems precluded his
employment. 142 The father admitted to having no income at the time of the
dependency adjudication, but said that since the adjudication he had become
eligible for social security disability payment and an increase in his veteran
administration benefits.'4a He also attributed his failure to attend parenting
classes to the family's financial circumstances. 144 Thus, under the facts of
the case, the court found that it could not find by clear and convincing
evidence that his parental rights should be terminated.145
B.

Appellate Issues

In W.J.E. v. Department of Children & Family Services,14s the question
was how far must counsel proceed in preserving the appellate rights of a
parent in a termination of parental rights case.14 - In W.J.E., as a matter of
caution, the father's court appointed lawyer filed an appeal without direction
from the client
148 after the client was served with a summons for trial but did
not appear.
Counsel filed an order to protect the client's rights on
appeal.
The lawyer was unable to contact the father to confirm his desire
to seek review.150 The appeals court held that by not responding to counsel's
efforts, the father had abandoned his appeal.'
The appellate court ruled
that where counsel does not know the client's wishes, he or she should write
to the client at the last known address advising of the deadline for appeal and
seeking confirmation of the client's wishes.
If the client does not respond
prior to the expiration of the appeal period, counsel has fulfilled his
or her
53
ethical obligations and duties and therefore need not file the appeal.1
The Supreme Court of Florida recently cleared up confusion concerning
the timing of appeals from dependency and termination of parental rights

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

24 Fla. L. Weekly D1027 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 1999).
Id. at D1027.
Id.
Id.
Id. at D1027-28.
K.CC., 24 Fla.L. Weekly at D1027.
731 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 850.
Id.
Id.
Id.
W.J.E., 731 So. 2d at 850.
Id.
Id.
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adjudications.' 54 The problem in two cases arose from the ambiguity in the
statute as to whether the appeal on the issue of either dependency or
termination of parental rights should be raised from the adjudicatory order or
from the
dispositional order.155 In G.L.S. v. Department of Children &
•• 156
Families, the supreme court held that an order which initially terminated
parental rights in a child dependency case ray be challenged upon appeal
from a subsequent final disposition order.' 57 While it was proper and
preferable to appeal from the earlier termination order, because of the
ambiguity in the statute, a termination order was subject to review from the
final disposition.158 In A.G. v. Departmentof Children & Family Services,'59
the court held that the same ambiguity existed in the dependency statute and
thus the issue of dependency could be16 raised
on appeal from the later
°
dispositional order in a dependency case.
IV. STATUTORY CHANGES

A.

Dependency and Terminationof ParentalRights

The legislature continued to make changes to chapter 39 during the
1999 legislative session, focusing on a number of specific areas. For
example, the legislature amended the definitional language in section 39.01
of the Florida Statutes governing harm to the child to include exposure to
controlled substances and alcohol. 161 In 1998, the legislature provided
parents the right to be represented by counsel and, if indigent, to be
appointed counsel in dependency cases. 162 This past year, the statute
governing shelter hearings was amended to provide that parents who appear
at the shelter hearing without counsel may have the shelter hearing continued
for up to seventy-two hours to enable them to consult legal counsel. 63
154. See G.L.S. v. Department of Children & Families, 724 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1998);
A.G. v. Department of Children & Family Servs., 731 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1999).
155. Id.
156. 724So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1998).
157. Id. at 1182.

158. Id. at 1185.
159. 731 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1999), on remand, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2199 (4th Dist. Ct.
App. Sept. 22, 1999) (dismissing the appeal without prejudice).
160. Id. at 1261-62.
161. Ch. 99-186, § 2, 1999 Fla. Laws 1001, 1012 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.01(30)(g)
(1999)).
162. Ch. 98-403, § 24, 1998 Fla. Laws 3081, 3122 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.013(1)
(1999)).
163. Ch. 99-193, § 23, 1999 Fla. Laws 1103, 1131 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
39.402(5)(b)2 (1999)).
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Durin that time, the child may be continued in shelter care if granted by the
court.

In a further effort to articulate grounds for loss of custody as part of a
dependency proceeding, the court amended the statute provision governing
arraignment hearings.'
When an individual appears for the arraignment
hearing and the court orders the individual to personally appear at the
adjudicatory hearing for dependency and provides appropriate information
about the time, date, and place of that hearing, then the individual's failure to
appear at the adjudicatory hearing constitutes consent to a dependency
adjudication. 66 This additional change in the statute leaves undecided the
issue of whether counsel's presence without the parent causes the same
result as described in several cases reported earlier in this survey. 167
A highly significant change in chapter 39 is the passage of a set of goals
for dependent children in shelter or foster care. 168 While the goals do not
create rights, they articulate aspirational concepts for these children
including the right "to enjoy individual dignity, liberty, pursuit of happiness,
and the protection
of their civil and legal rights as persons in the custody of
' 169
the state."
Finally, the legislature made a significant change in the methodology
for carrying out child protective services. 17° It amended Florida law to
provide that the sheriffs of Pasco, Manatee, and Pinellas counties shall
provide child protective investigative services and authorized the entry of a
contract between the Department of Children and Family Services and the
sheriff's departments of each county to carry out this task.
B.

Juvenile Delinquency

The legislature recently broadened the crimes for which juveniles may
now be charged as adults. With its amendment to section 985.227 of the
Florida Statutes, the legislature continued to expand the list of crimes for
which a fourteen or fifteen-year-old child may be tried as an adult. 72 The
164. Id.
165. Id. § 29, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1137 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.506(e) (1999)).
166. Id.
167. See discussion supra Part .IA.
168. Ch. 99-206, § 5, 1999 Fla. Laws 1245, 1253-55 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
39.4085 (1999)).
169. Id.
170. Ch. 98-180, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 1601, 1605-07 (codified at Fla. Stat. §
39.3065(2) (1999)).
171. Id.
172. Ch. 99-257, § 1, 1999 Fla. Laws 2993, 2993-94 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
985.227 (1999)).
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statute now provides that a child may be charged as an adult for grand theft
of an automobile if the child has previously been adjudicated for grand theft
of a motor vehicle. 173 The state attorney may file an information if in his or
her discretion he or she believes public interest requires adult sanctions.174
The criteria for discretionary direct filing of an information has been
amended to include the phrase "for the commission of, attempt to commit, or
conspiracy to commit" any of the crimes listed in section 985.227 of the
Florida Statutes.'75 Burglary with an assault or battery, possessing or
discharging any weapon or firearm on school grounds, home invasion
robbery, and carjacking have been added to the list of discretionary direct
file offenses. 76
Section 985.225 has been amended to require transfer of certain
juvenile felony cases to criminal court for prosecution as an adult in
instances where a guilty plea, nolo contendere, or a finding of guilt has not
been made. 1 "7 The same penalties will be applied to felony cases that were
transferred to adult court if the child is acquitted of all charged or lesser
included offenses in the indictment case. 178 A mandatory waiver application
has been added requiring the state attorney to request a waiver to prosecute
the child as an adult if the child is fourteen
179 years or older and has previously
been adjudicated delinquent for a felony.
The legislature has also authorized law enforcement agencies and
school districts to establish pre-arrest diversion programs in cooperation
with the state attorney.'8 ° As part of the program, a child who allegedly
commits a delinquent act may be required to relinquish his driver's license
or refrain from applying for one.18' The state attorney may notify the
Department of Motor Vehicles to suspend the child's driver's license for a
maximum of ninety days if the child fails to comply with the program.182
Possession or discharge of a weapon or firearm at a school event or on
school property is now included as one of the offenses for which a child may

173. Id.
174. Id.

175. Ch. 99-284, § 26, 1999 Fla. Laws 3087, 3119-20 (codified at
985.227(1)(a) (1999)).
176. Id. at 3120.
177. Id. § 35, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3131 (codified at FLA.

STAT.

FLA. STAT.

§

§ 985.225(4)(b) (1999)).

178. Id.
179. 1d § 37, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3131-33 (codified at FLA.

STAT.

§ 985.226(2)(b)1

(1999)).
180. Ch. 99-267, § 1, 1999 Fla. Laws 3022, 3023 (codified at FLA.

STAT.

§ 985.3065

(1999)).
181. Id.
182. Id.
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be fingerprinted . 183 The fingerprints may be given to the Department of Law
Enforcement to become part of the
state criminal history records and may
184
used by criminal justice agencies.
A number of changes were also made relating to school children possessing weapons on school property or at school sponsored events. 185 The
purpose of the amendments is to prevent children who have been charged
with possession of a firearm on school property from returning to the school
to cause injury. 186 The law requires placement of a child charged with
possessing or discharging a firearm in secure detention and that a probable
cause hearing is held within twenty-four hours once the state acquires
custody of the minor.187 At the hearing, the court may order the child to
remain in secure detention for up to twenty-one days, during which time the
child will receive "medical, psychiatric, psychological, or substance abuse
examinations," followed by a written report of examination findings. 88 The
state attorney may authorize the release of the minor 89before the probable
cause hearing where the child was wrongfully charged.1
Carjacking, home invasion robbery, and burglary with an assault or
battery are added to the list of offenses for which a youth, thirteen years of
age at the time of the disposition, _may be committed to a juvenile
correctional facility or juvenile prison. 90 "Juvenile correctional facilit[ies]"
or "juvenile
191 prison[s]" replace the term "maximum-risk residential
program."'
Although a significant portion of recent legislation increases the child's
criminal accountability, the legislature created several projects that promote
child development while the child is in the custody of the Department of
Juvenile Justice. Emphasizing that education is the most significant factor in
the rehabilitation of a delinquent child, section 230.23161 of the Florida
Statutes now designates the Department of Education as the lead agency for

183. Ch. 99-284, § 14, 1999 Fla. Laws 3087, 3105-06 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
985.212(1)(b)13 (1999)).

184. Id. at 3106.
185. Id. § 3, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3095-97 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 790.115 (1999)); Ma
§ 14, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3105-06 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 985.212(1)(b) (1999)).
186. House of Representatives Committee on Law Enforcement and Crime Prevention
Bill Analysis & Economic Impact Statement. Jan. 12, 1999. HB.349.
187. Ch.99-284, § 3, 1999 Fla. Laws 3087, 3097 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 790.115(4)
(1999)).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. § 40, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3133-35 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 985.313(1) (1999)).
191. Id. at 3133.
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educational programs in the juvenile justice system. 192 The new law requires
extensive collaboration between the Department of Education and the
Department of Juvenile Justice to implement and/or expand effective
educational and technical programs for youth in the Department of Juvenile
Justice programs. 193 Public schools shall provide instruction for juveniles in
the Juvenile Justice programs194 and model procedures for the transition of
youth in and out of juvenile justice programs must be developed. 195
V. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Florida cleared up several conflicts among
Florida's district courts of appeals involving appeals from dependency and
termination cases and dispositional matters in delinquency cases this year.
The legislature made several substantial changes in the dependency and
termination field, although there were no wholesale changes.
One
problematic area left unresolved by the legislature is the reduction, without
explanation, in the provision of guardians ad litem to children in
dependency and termination parental rights cases.

192. Ch. 99-284, § 48, 1999 Fla. Laws 3087, 3144 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
230.23161(1) (1999)).
193. Id. See also id. § 43, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3136-37 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
228.081(2) (1999)).
194. Id. § 42, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3135 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 228.051 (1999)).
195. Id. § 43, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3137 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 228.081(3)(b) (1999)).
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